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Abstract
This paper uses analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to assess the
efficiency impacts of agricultural policies in a second-best setting with pre-existing
distortionary taxes.  We analyze production subsidies, production quotas, acreage controls,
subsidies for acreage reductions and lump sum transfers to agricultural producers.  We find
that pre-existing taxes raise the cost of all these policies and by a substantial amount.  Under
our central estimates this increase in cost is typically at least 100-200 percent.
Two effects underlie these results.  First, raising the rates of distortionary taxes to
finance subsidy policies leads to additional efficiency losses.  Second, policies that raise
(lower) the costs of producing agricultural output lead to a reduction (increase) in the
economy-wide level of employment.  This implies an efficiency loss (gain) in the labor
market, which is distorted by taxes.  The latter effect is not incorporated in earlier studies.
Consequently, previous studies have significantly overstated the costs of production subsidies
and understated the costs of production quotas, acreage controls and subsidies for acreage
reductions.
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AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN THE
PRESENCE OF DISTORTING TAXES
Ian W. H. Parry*
1.   INTRODUCTION
Throughout the world, governments continue to intervene substantially in agricultural
markets.  In developed countries this intervention has traditionally taken the form of policies
to increase domestic producer prices, such as production subsidies, production quotas, acreage
controls and import restrictions.1  Very recently, and particularly in the U.S., there has been
less reliance on this type of regulation, but at the same time environmental programs--such as
subsidies for acreage reduction--have been expanded.  Developing countries have tended to
subsidize inputs into the agricultural sector, while holding down output prices.
This paper analyzes the gross efficiency costs of some of these policy instruments.2
We examine a production subsidy, production quota, acreage control, subsidy for acreage
reduction (SAR) and a lump sum transfer (LST) to agricultural producers.  The crucial point
of departure from previous studies is the focus on general equilibrium effects and in particular
the implications of pre-existing tax distortions in the labor market.  Several analysts have
pointed out that--in addition to the efficiency impact within the agricultural sector--raising
taxes to finance agricultural subsidy policies leads to an efficiency cost.3  This is the cost of
the added distortion to the labor market caused by, for example, increasing the rate of
personal or payroll tax.  Parry (1997a) refers to this cost as the revenue-financing effect.
However, there is another efficiency consequence of agricultural policies that has not
been recognized in the literature.4  Policies that raise the costs of agricultural production tend
to reduce the overall level of employment in the economy.  The reduction in employment
leads to an efficiency loss, given the wedge between the gross and net wage created by the tax
system.  This has been termed the tax-interaction effect in recent analyses of environmental
regulations (Goulder, 1995).  The tax-interaction effect raises the costs of the production
                                               
* Fellow, Energy and Natural Resources Division, Resources for the Future.  The author thanks Mike Toman for
helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.  Correspondence to: Ian Parry, Resources for the Future,
1616 P Street NW, Washington, DC 20036.  Phone: (202) 328-5151; email:  parry@rff.org
1 See the survey in Sanderson (1990).
2 We do not consider potential benefits from the policies, such as enhanced natural habitat from land set-asides.
3 See Gardner (1983a), Alston and Hurd (1990), and Moschini and Sckokai (1994).
4 Earlier studies "tack on" the revenue-financing effect to a partial equilibrium model of the agricultural sector.
They are not fully general equilibrium models because they do not capture the spillover effects in other distorted
markets of the economy resulting from changes in the relative price of agricultural output.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 98-05
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quota, acreage control and SAR.  In contrast, it partially offsets the revenue-financing effect
from the production subsidy.
We find that pre-existing taxes substantially raise the cost of all the policies examined.
In our central case estimates, this increase in cost is typically at least 100-200 percent.
Previous studies that have ignored the tax-interaction effect have significantly underestimated
the overall costs of production quotas, acreage controls and SARs.  Conversely, studies that
incorporate the revenue-financing effect but neglect the tax-interaction effect, significantly
overstate the costs of production subsidies.
We also find that production quotas are a more cost-effective means of transferring
income to agricultural producers than LSTs (for transfers up to 10 percent of agricultural
income and given our central parameter values).  That is, the efficiency costs of financing
LSTs by distortionary taxes outweighs the tax-interaction effect and distortion of the
agricultural market under production quotas.5  In contrast, production subsidies are around
30-60 percent more costly than LSTs.  Acreage controls and SARs are at least 200 percent
more costly than LSTs.
Our results are consistent with recent studies of the tax-interaction effect in other
contexts.  Goulder et al. (1997) estimate that pre-existing taxes can raise the costs of modest
reductions in sulfur emissions by several hundred percent, when emissions are reduced by
(non-auctioned) quotas.6  Browning (1997) estimated that the costs of monopoly pricing in
the economy are several times larger when allowance is made for the impact on compounding
tax distortions in the labor market.  In each of these cases the economy-wide change in
employment is "small."  However, the cost per unit reduction in employment is "large"
because various taxes combine to drive a substantial wedge between the gross and net wage
(see below).  This means that the efficiency loss in the labor market can still dominate the
partial equilibrium effect of a regulation or other market distortion.7
In the next section we present a simple analytical model.  This model decomposes the
general equilibrium efficiency impacts of a production subsidy and quota, in the presence of a
tax on labor income.  Section 3 describes an extended version of the model that incorporates
land as a factor input and considers additional policy instruments.  This model is solved
numerically using US data, although it could be applied to other countries.  We consider cases
in which land is transferable between production sectors and where it is sector-specific.
Section 4 presents the empirical results and sensitivity analysis from the numerical model.
Section 5 offers conclusions and discusses some caveats to the analysis.
                                               
5 Thus, the substitution of LSTs for production subsidies, reflected in the 1995 Farm Bill, is still efficiency
improving in our analysis.
6 Parry et al. (1996) find similar results for non-auctioned carbon quotas.
7 For a diagrammatic exposition see Parry (1997b).Ian W. H. Parry RFF 98-05
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2.   THE ANALYTICAL MODEL
In this section we use an analytical model to illustrate qualitatively the efficiency
impacts of a subsidy and quota on agricultural production in the presence of a pre-existing tax
on labor income.8
A.   Model Assumptions
We assume a static, representative agent model.  The household utility function is:
) , , ( L L Y X U U - =   (2.1)
X is the consumption of agricultural output and Y is an aggregate of all other consumption.  L
- L is hours of leisure or non-market time, where L  is the household time endowment and L is
labor supply.  We normalize the gross wage rate to unity.
X and Y are produced by competitive firms using labor.  The marginal product of labor
is taken to be constant in both sectors implying supply curves are perfectly elastic (for a given
gross wage).  The extended model in Section 3 incorporates land as a factor of production and
upward sloping supply curves.9  Choosing units to imply marginal products (and hence
producer prices) of unity, the economy's resource constraint is:
L Y X = +   (2.2)
The government has an exogenous spending requirement of G, levies a tax of t on
labor income and regulates the agricultural sector.  For simplicity, G is assumed to be a lump
sum transfer to households.10  We assume the government budget must balance.  Therefore,
changes in government revenues resulting from agricultural policies are neutralized by
adjusting the rate of labor tax.11
Given the above assumptions there are no pre-existing distortions in the agricultural
sector, hence policy intervention will necessarily lead to an efficiency loss in this market.
There are a variety of alleged benefits from farm programs from the stabilization of
commodity prices to food security and the preservation of rural communities.  More recently,
policies such as the conservation reserve program in the US have been justified on
                                               
8 The model in this section shares some features of those in Goulder et al. (1997) and Parry (1997a), that were
applied in the context of environmental regulations.
9 However, we do not incorporate capital accumulation in the model.  This would require making the model
dynamic and allowing for taxes on capital.
10 Alternatively we could assume that G is a public good.
11 More generally a production subsidy, for example, could be financed by increasing the budget deficit rather than
increasing current taxes.  This shifts the necessary tax increase, and implied efficiency loss, to a future period.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 98-05
12
worked, the labor force participation rate and effort on the job.29  We assume a pre-existing tax
rate on labor and land of 40 percent.30  These parameters imply a marginal excess burden of
labor taxation in our model equal to 0.27, which is broadly consistent with other studies (for
example Browning, 1987; and Ballard et al., 1985).  We assume the rent tax is 20 percent.31
The elasticities of substitution in production are both chosen to be unity.  This is a
standard assumption, and our results are not sensitive to alternative values.  Finally, the
distribution parameters are chosen to imply that--in the absence of agricultural policies--the
share of agricultural output in the total value of output is 3 percent; the share of labor and land
earnings in the value of agricultural output are both 50 percent; and the share of labor and land
earnings in the value of economy-wide output are 90 percent and 10 percent respectively.32
Below, we refer to our benchmark case with the income tax as the "second-best" case.
We also consider a "first-best" case in which the pre-existing income tax is set to zero, and
any expenditure (revenue) consequences of agricultural policies are neutralized by lump sum
transfers from (to) households.33  The efficiency effects generated in the first-best case
correspond to the primary efficiency cost terms defined in equations (2.12) and (2.12¢).
4.   RESULTS
This section illustrates the empirical significance of pre-existing taxes by comparing the
first-best and second-best costs of agricultural policies.  We consider the costs of non-
incremental policy changes, as opposed to the incremental policy changes examined in Section 2.
In the extended model there are three potential efficiency effects due to interactions
with the tax system.  These are the tax-interaction and revenue-recycling effects discussed
above, and another effect, which we call the factor-shifting effect.  Policies that reduce
agricultural production lead to a shift away from the land-intensive sector (agriculture) to the
labor-intensive sector (non-agriculture).  This increases the aggregate demand for, and price
of, labor relative to land.  In turn, this induces a substitution out of leisure and into labor,
which produces an efficiency gain by offsetting the distortion from labor taxation.  This is the
factor-shifting effect.  For policies that directly reduce agricultural land the factor-shifting
effect is (relatively) stronger, while for policies that increase agricultural production, the
factor-shifting effect reduces the aggregate demand for labor relative to land and implies an
                                               
29 See for example the survey by Russek (1994).  We use a slightly higher value for the compensated elasticity
since the studies in his survey do not capture effort effects.
30 Other studies use similar values (for example Lucas, 1990; and Browning, 1987).  The sum of federal income,
state income, payroll and consumption taxes amounts to around 36 percent of net national product.  This average
rate is relevant for the labor force participation decision.  The marginal tax rate, which affects average hours
worked and effort on the job, is higher because of various deductions.
31 Rent is effectively profits and these are subject to personal income taxation.  Since these profits come from
the agricultural sector they are not subject to corporate income tax.
32 These figures were inferred from data in the Economic Report of the President.
33 For this case we re-calibrate parameter values such that the model replicates the rest of our benchmark data.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 98-05
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efficiency loss.34  Our discussion mainly focuses on the tax-interaction and revenue-financing
effects, since, except for the acreage control, they are relatively more important than the
factor-shifting effect.
Subsections A to D examine policies individually.  Subsection E compares the costs of
the policies, with that of the LST, on the basis of how much income is transferred to
agricultural producers.  The final subsection discusses the sensitivity of the results to
alternative parameter values.
A.   Production Subsidy
Figure 1 illustrates how interactions with pre-existing taxes affect the marginal cost of
increasing agricultural output by a production subsidy.  In this figure, and figures 2-4, the
solid curves indicate marginal costs in the second-best case when the pre-existing income tax
is 40 percent, and the dashed curves indicate marginal costs in a first-best case when the
income tax is zero.  In addition, "circle" and "triangle" legends indicate cases when land is
flexible and fixed respectively.  The (marginal) costs are general equilibrium welfare losses
expressed as a percentage of initial agricultural revenue.  There are several noteworthy
features from Figure 1.
First, in the first-best case marginal costs are increasing.  This reflects the increasing
gap between marginal social cost (the height of the supply curve) and marginal social benefit
(the height of the demand curve) as agricultural output is increased.  The height of the
(dashed) curves corresponds to the primary efficiency cost term (dW
P) in equation (2.11).
Marginal costs are lower in the flexible land scenario, because of Le Chatelier's Principle--it
is easier to increase agricultural output when land, as well as labor, can be transferred from
the non-agricultural sector.  Both curves have a zero intercept since the marginal benefit and
marginal cost of producing X are equal when the subsidy is zero.  They are also (slightly)
concave, because the demand curve for agricultural output is convex.
Second, the effect of pre-existing taxes is to shift up the marginal cost curves so that
they have a positive intercept (as predicted by the analytical model).  This is because the
efficiency loss from the revenue-financing effect dominates the efficiency gain from the tax-
interaction effect.  Thus, studies which do not take into account interactions with the tax
system understate the total cost of production subsides by a potentially substantial amount.
For example, the total cost of a 5 percent and 20 percent increase in agricultural output--the
area under the marginal cost curve--is around 6.5 and 2.5 times as large in the second-best
case relative to the first-best case (in both fixed and flexible land scenarios).
Third the absolute--as opposed to the proportionate--increase in marginal costs due to
pre-existing taxes is a little greater when land is fixed than when land is flexible.  This is
because when land is fixed a larger subsidy is required to increase output by any given amount,
which implies a larger net efficiency loss from the revenue-financing and tax-interaction effects.
                                               
34 For a discussion of these types of effects in the context of environmental regulation, see Bovenberg and
Goulder (1997).14
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B.   Production Quota
Figure 2 shows the corresponding marginal cost curves for a production quota that
reduces agricultural output.  This time the first-best marginal costs are convex since forgone
incremental benefits from consuming X are increasing at an increasing rate.  Marginal costs
are higher in the first-best, fixed land case than the flexible land case--but only slightly so.
This is because even when land is flexible it is not easily transferred from the agricultural to
the non-agricultural sector, because the latter is relatively labor-intensive.
Again, the second-best marginal cost curves lie above the first-best curves and have
positive intercepts, but for different reasons than in the subsidy case.  Under the production
quota, the tax-interaction effect raises rather than lowers the position of the marginal cost
curve.35  The total cost of reducing agricultural output by 5 percent and 20 percent
respectively is approximately 4.5 and 2 times as large in the second-best case relative to the
first-best case (when land is flexible or fixed).  This means that neglecting the tax-interaction
effect can lead to a substantial underestimate of the costs of a production quota.
C.   Acreage Control
There are three noteworthy features in Figure 3.  First, in the first-best case there is a
substantial difference between the flexible and fixed land scenarios.  In the flexible land case
the marginal cost curve reflects the difference between the value marginal product of agricultural
land net of the supply price of agricultural land.  The value marginal product increases as land is
reduced because it is increasingly difficult to substitute labor for land in agricultural production
and because consumers are increasingly less willing to give up agricultural consumption.  In
addition, the return from transferring land to the non-agricultural sector is declining.  For these
reasons the marginal cost of reducing agricultural land is upward sloping.  In the fixed land case,
the reduction in agricultural land is left idle rather than transferred to the non-agricultural sector.
Hence the marginal cost is the inverse of the value marginal product of agricultural land gross of
the supply price of agricultural land.  The value marginal product is more elastic in the fixed land
scenario because households suffer a first order income loss from the reduction in land
endowment and agriculture is a normal good.  Thus, the marginal cost when land is fixed is
initially well above that when land is flexible, however it has a flatter slope.36
Second, in the flexible land case pre-existing taxes actually slightly reduce the
marginal cost of the acreage control.  The policy raises the costs of agricultural production.
This leads to a negative tax-interaction effect.  However, this is more than offset by a
favorable factor-shifting effect: the substitution between labor and land in the production of
                                               
35 The quota does produce an indirect efficiency gain because the quota tax revenues are used to reduce the
income tax.  However, this effect is dominated by the tax-interaction effect.
36 Indeed the two curves eventually intersect.  At this point, the height of the value marginal product curve in the
fixed land case equals the gap between the value marginal product and the supply curve in the flexible land case.16
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agricultural output, and the shift from agricultural to non-agricultural production, both raise
the demand for labor relative to land.  This increases the price of labor and induces some
substitution out of leisure.
Third, in contrast when land is fixed the acreage restriction is much more costly in the
presence of pre-existing taxes.  In this case the policy reduces the availability of land, rather
than transferring it to a labor-intensive sector.  This means that land rather than labor becomes
the relatively scarce factor, resulting in a fall in the relative price of labor.  Hence the factor-
shifting effect reinforces rather than offsets the tax-interaction effect.  In addition, the reduced
base of the land tax implies a higher tax rate on labor to maintain budget balance.
D.   SAR
The SAR policy is equivalent to the acreage control, except in one respect: it involves
a payment from the government to agricultural producers equal to the subsidy rate multiplied
by the reduction in agricultural land.  This has no efficiency implications in the first-best case,
since the payment is financed by lump sum transfers.  Therefore, the marginal cost of
reducing agricultural land under the SAR and acreage restriction policies are identical in the
first-best case.
In the second-best case the subsidy payment is financed by distortionary taxation, and
the revenue-financing and tax-interaction effects both imply efficiency losses.  However the
base of the subsidy is relatively "small" since it is the reduction in agricultural land (as
opposed to the whole level of output in the case of the production subsidy).  Nonetheless
second best total costs of the SAR are still 2-3 times as high as first best costs, in both the
flexible and fixed land scenarios.
E.   Comparison of Policy Instruments
We now compare the costs of the policy instruments relative to those from an LST to
pre-existing agricultural producers.  We base the comparison on the amount of income the
policy transfers to agricultural producers.  This is calculated by revenue less labor and land
costs; that is, the producer surplus arising from subsidy payments or rents generated by
quantity controls.  There are no efficiency costs from the LST in a first-best setting because it
has no effect on output per producer, or the number of agricultural producers.  However in a
second-best setting, the LST leads to an efficiency loss from the revenue-financing effect.  In
our analysis, this efficiency cost equals 27 percent of the amount of income transferred.  The
curves in Figures 5a (flexible land case) and 5b (fixed land case) show the total (as opposed to
marginal) efficiency costs of the above policy instruments for income transfers up to 10
percent of initial agricultural revenue.37  These are expressed relative to the costs of the LST.
                                               
37 Annual government payments to farmers were 5-9 percent of gross farm income in the U.S. between 1990
and 1994 (see the Statistical Abstract of the United States).19










0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20



















































Flexible land, t=0.4 Flexible land, t=0 Fixed land, t=0.4 Fixed land, t=0Ian W. H. Parry RFF 98-05
20
Therefore, when a curve lies below (above) the horizontal line at unity, the cost of the policy
is less (greater) than that of the LST, for a given amount of income transferred to agricultural
producers.
The production subsidy is very costly relative to the other policy instruments in the
flexible land case.  For example, it is 9-15 times as costly as the LST (this is not shown in
Figure 5a).  The reason is that the agricultural supply curve is relatively elastic and most of
the subsidy payment "leaks" away in consumer surplus.  Hence, a much higher subsidy
payment is required to achieve a given net transfer to agricultural producers than with the
LST, which involves no leakage.  This means that the net efficiency loss from the revenue-
financing effect, tax-interaction effect and primary cost under the production subsidy swamp
the cost of the revenue-financing effect under the LST.  When land is fixed the agricultural
supply curve is much more inelastic and there is much less leakage to consumers.
Consequently, the cost of the production subsidy falls to 1.3-1.6 times that of the LST
(Figure 5b).
The production quota effects a transfer from agricultural consumers to producers.  For
the range of transfers considered the primary cost of the quota is relatively small.  However,
the tax-interaction effect raises the overall cost of the quota to 30-36 percent of the LST in the
flexible land case and 48-56 percent in the fixed land case.
Due to the factor-shifting effect (see above) the acreage control would be the least
costly way of raising income to agricultural producers in the flexible land case.  However, in
practice the reduced land under acreage controls is idled rather than transferred to other uses,
hence the fixed land scenario is more realistic.  In this case the policy is 3 times as costly as
the LST.  The cost of the SAR exceeds that of the acreage control because of the revenue-
financing effect.  Again the fixed land scenario is more realistic since land set aside under--for
example the Conservation Reserve Program in the US--is idled.  In this case the SAR is
slightly more than 3 times as costly as the LST.
To sum up Figures 5a and b, the cost of the production subsidy exceeds that of the
LST, which in turn exceeds that of the production quota, for the range of income transfers
considered.  Assuming the land taken out of agriculture is idled, the costs of the SAR and
acreage control are much higher than that of the production subsidy.
F.   Sensitivity Analysis
The above results are based on median estimates for parameter values.  We now
discuss how the costs of policies are affected by alternative assumptions about key
parameters.  The results are not particularly sensitive to different assumptions about the
relative size of agriculture in the total value of output, the land to labor ratio in the agricultural
sector and the elasticity of substitution in production.38
                                               
38 Changing these parameters may significantly affect absolute costs, but not as a proportion of agricultural
revenue.21
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The first row in Table 1 shows the intercept of the marginal cost curves in Figures 1-4
for the flexible and fixed land cases when the pre-existing income tax is 40 percent.  The
second row shows the effects on these intercepts from varying the consumption/leisure
substitution elasticity to imply an uncompensated labor supply elasticity of between 0 and 0.3.
This lowers or raises the intercepts for the production subsidy and production quota by
roughly 50 percent in each direction.  A higher labor supply elasticity implies a stronger tax-
interaction effect and hence a higher (marginal) cost from the production quota.  It also
implies a greater net loss from the revenue-financing and tax-interaction effects under the
production subsidy.39
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a Assumes an uncompensated labor supply elasticity of 0.15, agricultural demand elasticity of 0.4, and an agricultural
expenditure elasticity of 0.4.
The third row varies the uncompensated demand elasticity for agricultural
consumption between 0.1 and 1.  A more inelastic demand curve implies a larger subsidy
payment, and hence revenue-financing effect, to induce a given increase in output.  It also
implies a larger tax-interaction effect under the production quota, since the increase in product
price is lower for a given reduction in agricultural output.  Indeed the intercepts of the
marginal costs under both production subsidy and production quota are 3-5 times as large,
when the demand elasticity is reduced from 0.4 to 0.1.
The fourth row of Table 1 varies the agricultural expenditure elasticity between 0.1 and 1.
The larger this elasticity, the greater the degree of substitution between agricultural consumption
and leisure, and hence the larger the tax-interaction effect.  This implies a lower marginal cost
under the production subsidy and a higher marginal cost under the production quota.
                                               
39 The proportionate variation in costs is somewhat smaller under the acreage control and SAR, since the factor-
shifting effect dampens the overall effect of pre-existing taxes.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 98-05
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5.   CONCLUSION
This paper examines the costs of agricultural policies in a second-best setting with pre-
existing tax distortions in factor markets.  We analyze a production subsidy, production quota,
acreage control, subsidy for acreage reduction and a lump sum transfer to agricultural
producers.  In general pre-existing taxes raise the costs of all these policy instruments and by
a substantial amount--typically at least 100-200 percent.  These additional costs reflect the
revenue-financing and tax-interaction effects.  The revenue-financing effect is the cost of
financing subsidy policies by raising the rates of pre-existing distortionary taxes.  The tax-
interaction effect is the spillover effect in factor markets caused by changes in the relative
costs of producing agricultural output.  In the case of production quotas, acreage controls and
subsidies for acreage reduction, the tax-interaction effect is an efficiency loss.  In the case of a
production subsidy, it is an efficiency gain and partially offsets the revenue-financing effect.
On the basis of transferring income to agricultural producers, acreage controls and subsidies
for acreage reduction are easily the most costly, followed by production subsidies, lump sum
transfers and, least costly, production quotas.  Thus, overall our results provide some support
for the 1995 Farm Bill in the U.S., which replaced production subsidies and acreage controls
for grains with lump sum transfers.
Some caveats to the analysis deserve mention.  First, again we emphasize that the
analysis focuses purely on the cost side of agricultural policies.  A more complete evaluation
of, for example, the conservation reserve program in the US would weigh economic costs
against the environmental benefits.  Second, the above analysis assumes a closed economy.
In practice, agricultural commodities are traded between countries.  A useful extension to the
analysis would incorporate international trade and examine trade policies such as import
tariffs and export subsidies.  Third, the analysis examines agricultural policies in isolation.
Another useful extension would disaggregate the agricultural sector and consider interactions
between different agricultural policies, in addition to interactions with the tax system.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 98-05
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